YARAify Scan Results

You are viewing the YARAify database entry for the file with the SHA256 hash 2414ec50b3f320081c40bb7c2c297e54e57a18e774feb88ed0c2ddb7c96eca81.

Scan Results


SHA256 hash: 2414ec50b3f320081c40bb7c2c297e54e57a18e774feb88ed0c2ddb7c96eca81
File size:46'740 bytes
File download: Original
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
MD5 hash: 270b0129d07aab04f2f5e8c2d9d137e4
SHA1 hash: 5d532d0b576af8d14087bdc85229e5c84ed10490
SHA3-384 hash: 25712b2c7973e8ea0854868db4179460e91475ef081933e28ffe4d36d098b866efbcfff954c5fd55a0e087ffe399e5e4
First seen:2026-03-29 17:30:44 UTC
Last seen:Never
Sightings:1
imphash : 28127b183acd54f62da28481654078f8
ssdeep : 768:uuwpFTAY3IQWUe9jqmo2qLoKjPGaG6PIyzjbFgX3i2XXf9r1BDZ6x32:uuwpFTA4/2xKTkDy3bCXSIXl3d6x32
TLSH :n/a
telfhash :n/a
gimphash :n/a
dhash icon :n/a

Tasks


There are 1 tasks on YARAify for this particular file. The 10 most recent ones are shown below.

Task Information


Task ID:042028d6-2b95-11f1-b47f-42010aa4000b
File name:270b0129d07aab04f2f5e8c2d9d137e4
Task parameters:ClamAV scan:True
Unpack:False
Share file:True

ClamAV Results


The file matched the following open source and commercial ClamAV rules.

Signature:Win.Packed.AsyncRAT-9856570-1
Signature:Win.Packed.AsyncRAT-9861056-1
Signature:Win.Packed.Razy-9625918-0
Signature:YARA.SECUINFRA_SUSP_Reverse_Run_Key.UNOFFICIAL
Signature:YARA.SEKOIA_Rat_Win_Asyncrat.UNOFFICIAL

YARA Results


Static Analysis

The following YARA rules matched on the file (static analysis).

Rule name:AsyncRat
Author:kevoreilly, JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:AsyncRat Payload
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:CAPE
Rule name:asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:CAPE
Rule name:asyncrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:CAPE
Rule name:classified
Description:classified
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:diˈtekSHən
Rule name:MAL_AsnycRAT
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:MalwareBazaar
Rule name:MAL_AsyncRAT_Config_Decryption
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects AsnycRAT based on it's config decryption routine
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:YARAify
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:JPCERTCC
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:https://github.com/NYAN-x-CAT/AsyncRAT-C-Sharp
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:JPCERTCC
Rule name:msil_suspicious_use_of_strreverse
Author:dr4k0nia
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:YARAify
Rule name:SUSP_DOTNET_PE_List_AV
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detecs .NET Binary that lists installed AVs
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Rule name:SUSP_Reverse_Run_Key
Author:SECUINFRA Falcon Team
Description:Detects a Reversed Run Key
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:SIFalcon
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:YARAify
Rule name:win_asyncrat_bytecodes
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects bytecodes present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:embee-research
Rule name:win_asyncrat_j1
Author:Johannes Bader @viql
Description:detects AsyncRAT
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:Sandnet
Rule name:win_asyncrat_unobfuscated
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects strings present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:YARAify
Rule name:win_asyncrat_w0
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:Malpedia
Rule name:classified
Author:classified
Description:classified
TLP :TLP:AMBER
Rule name:Windows_Generic_Threat_ce98c4bc
Author:Elastic Security
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:elastic
Rule name:Windows_Trojan_Asyncrat_11a11ba1
Author:Elastic Security
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:elastic

Unpacker

The following YARA rules matched on the unpacked file.

Unpacked Files


The following files could be unpacked from this sample.