YARAify Scan Results

You are viewing the YARAify database entry for the file with the SHA256 hash 3616b62cd608610358b9664e68341b68935b03b9b662e055d265647d73a23b39.

Scan Results


SHA256 hash: 3616b62cd608610358b9664e68341b68935b03b9b662e055d265647d73a23b39
File size:276'480 bytes
File download: Original
MIME type:application/x-dosexec
MD5 hash: defedf486b2c8e3c6c6cb2f7ae92d662
SHA1 hash: 1b26efc504d6c737079f394b304abdff282a3cd5
SHA3-384 hash: c5529ee7701311dfd6191a2dbaccdac5e898772d034e486b6055275cbdab5c2547d894dc5484d0c9bba8f661e255e966
First seen:2026-03-14 19:58:55 UTC
Last seen:Never
Sightings:1
imphash : f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744
ssdeep : 6144:4u6iUsI26kb7Y/Pb0tfrM6MHOoJp9ovWTfb1uLnk3py0KM+NW2FRtrV:4h/kb8/4tjM65Mp9ovibdI0Tyj
TLSH :n/a
telfhash :n/a
gimphash :n/a
dhash icon : 00552ad8e96a9400

Tasks


There are 1 tasks on YARAify for this particular file. The 10 most recent ones are shown below.

Task Information


Task ID:3ba4d602-1fe0-11f1-b47f-42010aa4000b
File name:defedf486b2c8e3c6c6cb2f7ae92d662
Task parameters:ClamAV scan:True
Unpack:False
Share file:True

ClamAV Results


The file matched the following open source and commercial ClamAV rules.

Signature:Win.Packed.Razy-9625918-0

YARA Results


Static Analysis

The following YARA rules matched on the file (static analysis).

Rule name:AsyncRat
Author:kevoreilly, JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:AsyncRat Payload
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:CAPE
Rule name:asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:CAPE
Rule name:asyncrat_kingrat
Author:jeFF0Falltrades
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:CAPE
Rule name:CP_Script_Inject_Detector
Author:DiegoAnalytics
Description:Detects attempts to inject code into another process across PE, ELF, Mach-O binaries
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:YARAify
Rule name:classified
Description:classified
Rule name:DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI
Reference:https://github.com/naxonez/yaraRules/blob/master/AntiDebugging.yara
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Rule name:INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse
Author:ditekSHen
Description:Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:diˈtekSHən
Rule name:Mal_WIN_AsyncRat_RAT_PE
Author:Phatcharadol Thangplub
Description:Use to detect AsyncRAT implant.
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:YARAify
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:JPCERTCC
Rule name:malware_asyncrat
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:https://github.com/NYAN-x-CAT/AsyncRAT-C-Sharp
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:JPCERTCC
Rule name:msil_suspicious_use_of_strreverse
Author:dr4k0nia
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:
Rule name:Multifamily_RAT_Detection
Author:Lucas Acha (http://www.lukeacha.com)
Description:Generic Detection for multiple RAT families, PUPs, Packers and suspicious executables
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:
Rule name:NET
Author:malware-lu
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:
Rule name:NETDLLMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:
Rule name:NETexecutableMicrosoft
Author:malware-lu
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:
Rule name:Njrat
Author:botherder https://github.com/botherder
Description:Njrat
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:
Rule name:pe_imphash
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:MalwareBazaar
Rule name:Skystars_Malware_Imphash
Author:Skystars LightDefender
Description:imphash
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:MalwareBazaar
Rule name:Sus_CMD_Powershell_Usage
Author:XiAnzheng
Description:May Contain(Obfuscated or no) Powershell or CMD Command that can be abused by threat actor(can create FP)
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:YARAify
Rule name:SUSP_NET_Msil_Suspicious_Use_StrReverse
Author:dr4k0nia, modified by Florian Roth
Description:Detects mixed use of Microsoft.CSharp and VisualBasic to use StrReverse
Reference:https://github.com/dr4k0nia/yara-rules
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:Neo23x0
Rule name:VECT_Ransomware
Author:Mustafa Bakhit
Description:Detects activity associated with VECT ransomware. This includes registry modifications and deletions, execution of system and defense-evasion commands, suspicious API usage, mutex creation, file and memory manipulation, ransomware note generation, anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, and embedded cryptographic constants (SHA256) characteristic of this malware family. Designed for threat intelligence and malware detection environments.
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:YARAify
Rule name:win_asyncrat_bytecodes
Author:Matthew @ Embee_Research
Description:Detects bytecodes present in unobfuscated AsyncRat Samples. Rule may also pick up on other Asyncrat-derived malware (Dcrat/venom etc)
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:embee-research
Rule name:win_asyncrat_j1
Author:Johannes Bader @viql
Description:detects AsyncRAT
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:Sandnet
Rule name:win_asyncrat_w0
Author:JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Description:detect AsyncRat in memory
Reference:internal research
TLP:TLP:WHITE
Repository:Malpedia
Rule name:classified
Author:classified
Description:classified
TLP :TLP:AMBER

Unpacker

The following YARA rules matched on the unpacked file.

Unpacked Files


The following files could be unpacked from this sample.