YARAhub
You are currently viewing the YARAhub entry of the YARA rule MALWARE_OneNote_Delivery_Jan23. Depending on the TLP classification of this YARA rule chosen by the author, further information about this YARA rule is available below.
YARA Rule Details: MALWARE_OneNote_Delivery_Jan23
| Rule name: | MALWARE_OneNote_Delivery_Jan23 |
|---|---|
| Author: | SECUINFRA Falcon Team (@SI_FalconTeam) - @SI_FalconTeam |
| Description: | Detects suspicious Microsoft OneNote files used to deliver Malware |
| Reference MD5: | 65b3b312dfaf25a72e9171271909357e |
| Likes: | 1 |
| Reference Link : | n/a |
| Malpedia Family : | n/a |
| Date added: | 2023-01-19 |
| Rule Matching TLP : | TLP:WHITE |
| Rule Sharing TLP : | TLP:WHITE |
| License : | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| UUID: | 1b3f4b6b-9dd4-4080-af23-195078bf3abe |
| Static hits: | 86 |
| Unpacker hits: | 0 |
YARA Rule Content
The content of the YARA rule is shown below.
rule MALWARE_OneNote_Delivery_Jan23
{
meta:
author = "SECUINFRA Falcon Team (@SI_FalconTeam)"
description = "Detects suspicious Microsoft OneNote files used to deliver Malware"
reference = "https://twitter.com/James_inthe_box/status/1615421130877329409"
date = "2023-01-19"
tlp = "CLEAR"
hash0 = "18af397a27e58afb901c92f37569d48e3372cf073915723e4e73d44537bcf54d"
hash1 = "de30f2ba2d8916db5ce398ed580714e2a8e75376f31dc346b0e3c898ee0ae4cf"
hash2 = "bfc979c0146d792283f825f99772370f6ff294dfb5b1e056943696aee9bc9f7b"
hash3 = "e0d9f2a72d64108a93e0cfd8066c04ed8eabe2ed43b80b3f589b9b21e7f9a488"
hash4 = "3f00a56cbf9a0e59309f395a6a0b3457c7675a657b3e091d1a9440bd17963f59"
yarahub_reference_md5 = "65b3b312dfaf25a72e9171271909357e"
yarahub_uuid = "1b3f4b6b-9dd4-4080-af23-195078bf3abe"
yarahub_license = "CC BY 4.0"
yarahub_rule_matching_tlp = "TLP:WHITE"
yarahub_rule_sharing_tlp = "TLP:WHITE"
yarahub_author_twitter = "@SI_FalconTeam"
strings:
// HTA
$hta = "hta:application" nocase
$script1 = "type=\"text/vbscript\""
$script2 = "language=\"VBScript\""
// Powershell
$powershell = "powershell" nocase
$startProc = "Start-Process -Filepath"
$webReq = "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri"
$bitsadmin = "bitsadmin /transfer"
//WScript
$wscript = "WScript.Shell" nocase
$autoOpen = "Sub AutoOpen()"
$root = "GetObject(\"winmgmts:\\.\\root\\cimv2\")"
$wsfExt = ".wsf" ascii wide
$vbsExt = ".vbs" ascii wide
// Batch
$cmd = "cmd /c" nocase
$batch = "@echo off"
$batExt = ".bat" ascii wide
$delExit = "(goto) 2>nul & del \"%~f0\"..exit /b"
// PE Files
$dosString = "!This program cannot be run in DOS mode"
$exeExt = ".exe" ascii wide
// Image Lure
$imageFile = "button_click-to-view-document.png" wide
$click = "click to view document" nocase wide
// Leaked File Paths
$path1 = "C:\\Users\\My\\OneDrive\\Desktop" wide
$path2 = "C:\\Users\\Administrator\\Documents\\Dove" wide
$path3 = "C:\\Users\\julien.galleron\\Downloads" wide
condition:
uint32be(0x0) == 0xE4525C7B
and 3 of them
}
YARA Rule Matches
The following table shows the most recent files matching this particular YARA rule.
| First seen (UTC) | SHA256 hash | Static matches | Unpacker matches |
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